"Cześć!"

 

Living in the European Family

From Warsaw Voice

Stefan Meller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, talks to Andrzej Jonas and Witold Żygulski.

■ What is the priority of Poland’s foreign policy today?
I personally believe that what matters most now is to reflect on the current state of Euro-Atlantic relations. The question that I pose to myself is where Poland finds itself today. Or in other words: what is the future of the country—as a member of both the European Union and NATO—broadly perceived through the Polish-American Alliance?

■ Do you have the sense that defining Polish-American relations is a significant element of the Polish raison d’etat?
I may not be preoccupied by the definition of the relationship itself, but the mutual links between our EU membership and the alliance with the United States, if only in intellectual terms. Since I assumed office, I have regularly discussed these issues with my colleagues—ministers in the capitals of the EU countries. Various countries give various answers as to the essence of Euro-Atlantic relations. Poland faces no serious dilemma concerning this question, but the issue is interesting from the point of view of a historian and political scientist.

Another question of particular interest to me is everything that has taken place in the EU concerning the Constitutional Treaty. I have to know what Polish political forces, both parliamentary and non-parliamentary, think about Europe in general and about the Treaty in particular—in other words, about possibilities for regulating Europe. How do these forces perceive the future of Europe? In this context—what will happen to the Treaty. I must admit that positions on this matter, even here, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ), are very divergent, as attested by the meetings I regularly hold with the staff.

■ Poland has been an EU member for a year and a half; consequently, a new responsibility has emerged: for the EU.
Certainly, and that responsibility marks a completely new quality for Poland. Therefore I am bound to conduct educational work, bring home the new role and situation both to politicians and to the public. As the head of the merged Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) and the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE), I would like to organize series of meetings to discuss EU-related subjects with representatives of the parliament. These debates may later be expanded and become public.

Awareness is needed that every discussion about the EU today is essentially a discussion about how to live, how the life of Poles is to change in connection with EU membership; how Poland and Europe are to change in the coming decades.

It seems to me that we speak too little and too quietly about the advantages of EU membership. We do not stress the benefits the EU has already brought to Poland over the past 20 months, how much it has already facilitated and improved the functioning of the state and how much more it may do in the future. Poland’s accession to the EU—to be fully digested in the decades to come—marked a fundamental breakthrough for the role and position of Poland in Europe and the world. I would like the MSZ and UKIE today to be able to establish a dialogue in a clear language on this subject with Polish society. I do not mean schooling, but I would like Poles to become aware of what happened on May 1, 2004. As a state we have experienced a transition to a completely new configuration, that—if everything goes well—will place Poland in a large group of builders of a brave new world, just to refer to Aldous Huxley.

I share the view that the world today—from any perspective—is divided into forces modernizing it and those opposing modernization. Regardless of understanding the term “modernization”—whether in a technical or, for example, moral aspect—the EU favors all modernization trends, and Poland needs modernization in a great number of fields, not only in those connected with production in general. So, I see in the EU an enormous chance for Poland for development in every aspect of the life of the state and society.

■ Your personal experience as ambassador encompasses two directions where Poland has in recent years reported a deterioration in relations: France and Russia. How do you assess prospects for changing this?
Both cases are absolutely incomparable. With France, in fact a stunning regression has recently taken place. The relations chilled following the EU summit in Nice, when after the notorious mistake of a French secretary [reportedly made in typing the minutes of the deliberations—ed.] Poland was to obtain fewer votes on the EU Council than proportionally due on account of the population.

At the same time, however, France has moved to the first place in terms of leading investors on the Polish market. Here, at least one conclusion emerges: while evaluating political relations, one should not demonize them, but rather take a closer look at economic relations. The French economic class seems to be ahead of politicians; as my ambassadorial mission in Paris was nearing its end, I was mainly involved in meetings with French businesspeople and economic organizations intending to start activity in Poland. Looking back, I think that the crisis at that time in political relations stemmed from the inability of French politicians to resign themselves to the inevitability of EU enlargement. In communist Poland, we were isolated from the West, but the West was also isolated from us. Since 1989, we have rapidly made up for the ignorance resulting from the decades in isolation; the West, in my opinion, has not made up for that yet. The political class of France at first was carried away by euphoria over the explosion of Solidarity in the years 1980-81, then was petrified by terror after the introduction of martial law on December 13, 1981, and it has nurtured those extreme emotions, either positive or negative, to this day. Meanwhile, Poland has evolved to become a participant in the political game, while naturally remaining a target of various influences and pressures. Economically, it has continued to be a “poor cousin” and, despite excellent economic results, has remained such up till now.

In the French political class, I did not see the will to embrace the new situation. The talks I conducted were only very rarely genuinely in-depth and problem-oriented. The French showed a complete lack of knowledge of many areas of life in Poland and a propensity to resort exclusively to stereotypes. These stereotypes were best exemplified by the data quoted in France and concerning Polish agriculture, the number of individuals making a living from farming, etc.—they were produced out of thin air. Considering this, it would not be difficult to understand the frustration growing in the view of the impending enlargement of the EU, in particular that France is also a large agricultural country, a fact made evident at every EU debate.

The climax of that regrettable crisis in relations was marked by the notorious “Polish plumber”—another false stereotype, this time concerning threats to the French labor market in the wake of Poland’s accession to the EU and liberalization of regulations on the free movement of services and labor. The “plumber” became a figure of speech functioning in the public opinion, but—it is worth stressing—it was not taken seriously, I believe, by the French political class.

Recently a warming-up has been reported and I do not think it is a passing Polish-French love affair. We certainly have different opinions on many issues, but over the months of Polish presence in the EU the French people have become convinced that the potential threats supposedly linked with Polish accession have not materialized; that Poland is doing well in the EU. In short, the perception of Poland in France has normalized. Expressions of admiration and lofty declarations are not the point: what matters is acceptance for a large European country, a partner in the enlarged EU. Poland can no longer be passed over, so it is necessary to look for a different language. To sum up: the most important event in Poland’s relations with Europe in recent months has been the laying aside of stereotypes in the perception of Poland. Of course, they still function, persist, sometimes are even well received, but the key, after all, is seeing Poland as it really is.

■ Before we proceed to Russia, let us stop in Germany. In what way will the reorganization of their government influence Polish-German relations, and can Berlin’s stance also influence the policy pursued by Paris?
Beyond doubt, the transition in the fields of dialogue between Germany and Poland is bound to provide food for thought to the French politician pondering their environment—their place in Europe, treaties of alliance, balance, and more. Changes in Germany were closely observed in Paris, both countries often being referred to as the driving force of the EU. In a country as large as Germany, every change gives rise to minor or major “tectonic movements” throughout the continent. Today a change is under way in the German-American dialogue, elements of change also appear in the Berlin-Moscow relations. In this connection—the French policy not always being identical with that of Germany on either question—according to the natural order of things, Poland is a partner not to be passed over in relations with Russia and difficult to pass over in relations with the United States.

■ Another element of the new structure of Europe is the Weimar Triangle. Do you believe that changes in the European policy will enhance the importance of that informal group?
I hope so. I would not like to lionize the Weimar Triangle, but we should be grateful to France and Germany that at the moment of the group’s inception at the beginning of the 1990s they offered Poland—at that time not even a candidate to the EU—a helping hand adopting the country to the group. Today, Poland in the EU has started to occupy the position of an active member of the European family. It wants to be able to have an influence on what takes place in Europe, also through work within the Triangle. During debates, Poland submits its own subjects and proposals for action aimed at overcoming one problem or another, for the sake of assistance or prevention. For example, I would like to discuss during the next meeting of foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle countries the question of Ukraine, the political reforms under way there and the future place of Ukraine in Europe. In my opinion, there are also no obstacles for such an informal body as the Triangle to demonstrate its opinion in the debate concerning the energy security of Europe. I believe that the voice of the three important states on important issues for Europe need to be heard.

■ Moving eastwards: what were your experiences in Moscow?
They were very diversified. Let me say: during my stay in Moscow if I met someone who said that he or she knew Russia very well, I cut the conversation short. Such an opinion is just impertinent and untrue. Russia is huge; it experiences formidable problems, and will be experiencing them for some time. In thinking about Russia, we need to consider that today it is going through a period of a constant transformation, moreover, a transformation that consists of elements that do not match. The state also has problems with its identity, even geographically, let alone geopolitically; needless to say that this is the first and foremost effect of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

This is compounded by Russia’s problem with its historical identity, with collective memory—a problem of much interest to Poles, as it concerns us, among others. During the Soviet era, the attempts made by the democratic opposition at bringing back that historical memory, at putting straight the official, propaganda-fostered version of history, were ruthlessly quashed. But even today, in different conditions, the voice of representatives of democratic movements calling for filling the “blank spots” in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union is not given enough play by the Russian people and state. Such issues as World War II, for example, consequently present enormously difficult topics for the Polish-Russian dialogue. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept. 17, 1939 and the occupation of the areas of today’s western Ukraine and Belarus, repressions against the Polish population on those territories in the years 1939-45, the mass murder in the Katyn Forest in the spring of 1940—touching upon all these questions proves that we speak completely different languages and agreement is still impossible. I believe that things are not going to change until all the aforementioned events find themselves—in a historically objective form—in school and university textbooks in Russia.

This is more than a question of a historical debate. In my opinion, anything that continues to live a political life, anything that influences the quality of mutual relations, is not history yet. Neither is history what remains an unresolved issue from the point of view of international law. All the partitions of Poland in the 18th century conducted, among others, by Russia are undoubtedly history. Subsequent 19th-century uprisings in the Polish territories against the Russian “overlord”—are history as well. However, Sept. 17, 1939 is not entirely history, nor is the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944—when at Stalin’s order the Soviet army stopped the offensive towards the west bank of the Vistula River and did not come to the insurgents’ aid, allowing their extermination, despite the fact that Soviet propaganda earlier encouraged the Polish resistance movement to an armed bid for independence. Katyn is beyond doubt not history—until we have full disclosure and documentation, until we receive exhaustive explanations from the Russians, until the whole matter is more than just verbally condemned and reaches a legal conclusion. The execution in cold blood of thousands of Polish officers by the NKVD will not otherwise become a closed chapter in mutual relations.

■ Against the backdrop of what you said, what conditions have to be met in order for Polish-Russian relations to improve?
In my opinion, rather than reinventing our relations with Russia, the most significant matter today is how well we will manage to find a language for the needs of a debate about those relations with our partners in the EU. All actually depends on the very long process of building a democratic Russia. To achieve this goal, its international relations, including those with Poland, should be fully normalized. A good Warsaw-Moscow dialogue depends on the development of a good dialogue of the EU with Moscow. I think—and let me say that without any sense of superiority—that the duty of the European democracies in this dialogue is to unambiguously demonstrate that they are concerned about building a genuine democratic civil society in Russia. The future of the continent, in my opinion, largely depends on this. The EU therefore needs an insight concerning the democratic potential within Russian society and the Russian political scene, and also any threats to the process of democratization. An unstable and ideologically empty Russia poses a great danger to Europe.

■ Do you believe that Europe today is able to conduct this kind of constructive, pro-democratic dialogue with Moscow?
After the Cold War, when the Soviet Union started to disintegrate, the democratic world experienced a major concern whether the injured and weakened Soviet and subsequently Russian empire would start to behave in an unpredictable manner. Fortunately, nothing of that kind occurred on a global scale. Then followed a period of a collective favorable attitude on the part of the West towards Russia, an attitude to some extent resulting from the feeling of relief that nothing dramatic had taken place. Today we deal with a beginning of a different stage: the world observes the changes under way in Russia with calmness, discretion and reliability—but in a monitored manner. So, we will be dealing both with expressions of praise intended to draw Russia into all possible world institutions in order to oblige the country by those relations to cooperate, and with expressions of criticism —if only those recently heard on the occasion of the gas crisis, but also those concerning issues of limiting the activity of NGOs in Russia and the question of Chechnya. These opinions no longer come only from local political communities, but also from top-level state administrations.

■ Does the change in the tone observed during Angela Merkel’s recent visit to Moscow augur this kind of change in tone on the part of Europe towards Russia?
It would be still too early to judge. The tone used by the chancellor was ambiguous, to say the least. On one hand, when German interests were in question, the tone was friendly and ally-like; but on the other hand, the head of the German government for the first time in years has raised issues she considered reprehensible as well. That difference can be seen not only in the case of Germany: this kind of dual tone has also appeared in the position of many Western countries.

■ Under these conditions, does the Polish voice concerning Eastern policy have a chance to be heard with more attention in Brussels? Can the Polish experience in relations with Moscow be to a greater extent useful to the EU?
I think that this has been true, actually for a long time, but not always finding expression in public declarations. In my opinion, we have a very serious role to play in the EU, presenting our negative and positive experiences in relations with Russia. We ought to make sure now that the language of our arguments, even if strongly critical, is balanced enough to prevent traditional Russophobic accusations against Warsaw, as it is very easy to spoil the sense of even a good argument, if expressed with the wrong language.

It is worth making Western societies aware of the fact that Poland has had longtime traditions of supporting democracy in Russia, both in speech and action. During the communist era in Poland underground publications by the democratic opposition appeared, and a considerable proportion of the texts were devoted to analyses of the situation in Russia and Eastern policy. Back in the 19th century, Polish independence activists always argued that the future of a free and democratic Poland could not be built without a free and democratic Russia existing at its side.

■ In speaking about Polish-Russian relations, the argument is often raised in Moscow that Poland is traditionally hostile towards Russia, and Poles hostile towards Russians. Is the Russian public really convinced of this?
I cannot fully agree. This conviction mainly concerns some leading political communities. The stereotype of the “Polish enemy” was already widely used in Stalin’s times, with no differentiation between a “Polish lord” or nobleman living in the former eastern borderland of Poland, and a member of the Communist Party of Poland, decimated by Stalin’s apparatus of terror. Communities inimical towards Poland today often use an argument connected with the alleged treason committed by Poles, who, being Slavs, have entered NATO. The distinctness of Poles among Slavs is also stressed in connection with the Polish Catholicism, treated in Russia as a threat to the Orthodox faith. This kind of reasoning stems from completely different concepts of Slavism in our countries. In Russia it features a strictly political formula, while in Poland it is a geographic, ethnic concept.

Meanwhile, the political propaganda of the groups treating Poland as a hostile country does not translate into public opinion. At the time I was leaving Moscow, I saw a public opinion poll ranking the Poles at a very high position among the nations liked by the Russians.

Considerable differences among regions should be also mentioned. In Siberia, for example, a Pole is perceived in a different way than in Moscow. As the system of serfdom did not exist there, there was no local nobility. Polish exiles were the only aristocrats to appear there. So, a Pole in Siberia is a nobleman, a man of education and culture, having the courage to revolt against the authorities. A Pole in Irkutsk and Novosibirsk is someone who represents the elite.

Finally, Polish culture has enjoyed an excellent opinion in Russia for decades. Polish artists are treated there with a particular esteem. They occupy a special place there. I witnessed that in Moscow, when a young driver of a gas emergency service vehicle halted traffic because he recognized the movie director Andrzej Wajda. He wanted to talk to him about his films, about which he knew surprisingly much. The boy was very unhappy when other drivers forced him by honking to finish his chat with Wajda and move. I frankly doubt if that could happen in any other country.

So I believe we need to make a great effort to create a special state fund in order to ensure the constant presence of Polish culture in Russia—on a regular basis rather than on one-time events. The demand is really enormous. This kind of cultural offensive also should be addressed to the younger generation, as the enthusiasts of Polish culture may be today found mainly among the elderly.

One reason for joy today is that more Polish literature is being translated in Russia, and Russian literature, both classic and contemporary, after years of rejection by the Polish reader, is slowly returning to Polish bookstores. This “cultural diplomacy” can do much more for normalizing relations between states and nations than declarations by politicians.

posted by: Oborski at 16:23 | link | comments |

From Warsaw Voice...

HEARD IN PASSING!

"This shameful incident will further motivate me to fight the plague of car theft."
-Ferdynand Skiba, new police commander in Łódź, on the fact that a day before he took over the post, his car was stolen

"The authorities want me to be the Sejm enforcer and bouncer; I'm supposed to rush the rostrum and make a stand against things."
-Jacek Kurski, a deputy from the Law and Justice (PiS), on why he has been moved to the front row of seats in the Sejm hall

"The number of jokes about the government is directly proportional to the public's support for the prime minister and the government."
-Konrad Ciesiołkiewicz, press spokesman for Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz's government

"It turned out that Radio Jasna Góra provided the wrong number for sending requests for God's blessing."
-Ireneusz Nalazek, a councilor from the Democratic Left Alliance in Olsztyn, on the flood of religious text messages he received after purchasing a new mobile phone

"An inexcusable error occurred at the CD pressing stage. It seems the producer also collaborates with erotic magazines. We may demand compensation."
-Jacek Pająk, secretary of the editorial office of Dziennik Łódzki, after some readers received a CD ROM containing a German porn movie with the paper instead of a PIT calculation manual

"She explained that she cleaned her ears this way many times before and nothing ever happened. This time, she was very close to irreversibly injuring her eardrum."
-A doctor from a hospital in Łódź, on a patient who attempted to clean her ears with a vacuum cleaner

posted by: Oborski at 16:08 | link | comments |

From Warsaw Voice...

Heard in passing...

"During recent basic training, the obstacle course participants refused to traverse a water hazard, stating it was too dangerous."
-An anonymous officer of the elite Polish GROM commandos, on recent slackness in the unit

"We are anxious about the European Parliament's attempt to interfere with the condition of the Polish conscience."
-Archbishop Józef Życiński, Lublin metropolitan, on the EP resolution on homophobia in European Union member states

"If someone once belonged to the Polish United Workers' Party, they will be seen as a postcommunist even if they were Jesus Christ."
-Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, former prime minister, on the Polish political stage and social perceptions

"I was ennobled by governing, but it seems to me that the Kaczyński brothers are immune to that sort of nobility."
-Leszek Miller, former prime minister and former leader of the Democratic Left Alliance

"That's his style of politics: one day he says one thing and the next day something else. That's why I don't take his statements too seriously."
-Marek Suski, a deputy from Law and Justice, on Roman Giertych, leader of the League of Polish Families (LPR), declaring the LPR's protests if the government does not approve of pro-family tax reforms

"We spent the whole day at the airport, and the only assistance we got was an offer to take part in a holy mass."
-A passenger of a Łódź-London flight that was delayed seven hours

posted by: Oborski at 12:51 | link | comments |